Two alternative measures of demand adjusted capital input for the U.S. non-farm private business sector are derived and their differential impacts on the potential supply of output are compared to those obtained using the unadjusted index of capital input published by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The results show that, allowing for the demand pressure on the fixed assets of firms, leads to three effects. It raises the level of estimated potential output well above CBO's estimates; with the exception of the 1990s, the estimated growth rates turn out to be higher than those computed by CBO; and, lastly, the long term trend of the growth rates with and without the demand adjustment to the capital input is sloping downwards. The latter finding was not unexpected since aggregate demand, as reflected in the utilization rate of fixed assets by firms, has been trending downwards throughout the postwar period. Drawing on these findings it is concluded that the path to secular stagnation that the U.S. economy is following in the postwar period is not due solely to headwinds on the supply side. To some degree, perhaps significant, the deceleration in the expansion of productive capacity as well as in the intensity of its utilization is due to the declining long term aggregate demand. JEL Classification: E01, E22, O47
Introduction
The term output, with or without further qualification, is used to connote different things. For an example, consider the expression potential output. A cursory search in the relevant literature reveals that some use it to imply the highest level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that can be produced with a given mix of available resources and institutions; some others to signify the highest level of GDP that can be sustained over the long term; and still some others to denote the GDP that can be produced by an economy if all its resources are fully employed. This paper employs the following three definitions. The first of them is employed by the Congressional Budget Office (2001, 1) to estimate past and future growth rates of "maximum sustainable GDP consistent with a stable rate of inflation". In particular, as they explain in pages 8-9 of this publication, the approach by which they pursue this task is based on the Cobb-Douglas production function:
Potential output-the trend growth in the productive capacity of the economyis an estimate of the level of real GDP attainable when the economy is operating at a high rate of resource use. It is not a technical ceiling on output that cannot be exceeded. Rather, it is a measure of maximum sustainable output-the level of real GDP in a given year that is consistent with a stable rate of inflation.
Output supply is the value of goods and services produced within a certain period, say a quarter or a year. It corresponds to the real GDP reported in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). If output supply rises above potential output, constraints on productive capacity begin to bind, inflationary pressures build, and firms react by raising the utilization of their fixed assets. On the contrary, if output supply falls below potential output, resources are lying idle, inflationary pressures abate, and firms react by reducing the utilization of their fixed assets.
Output demand is the value of goods and services sold by firms for purposes of consumption and investment. It corresponds to real GDP plus the change in the inventories of raw materials and intermediate and finished goods. If output demand exceeds (falls short of) output supply, inventories decline (expand), price pressures build (abate), and for some time output supply increases (declines) mainly through adjustments by firms in the utilization of their fixed assets. However, over the longer run, and depending on whether the changes in output demand are perceived as permanent or transitory, firms may expand (shrink) productive capacity, and hence potential supply of output, by accelerating investment in or retirement of fixed assets, respectively.
where the symbols are defined as follows: t Q = real GDP in year t; 
This equation states that the growth rate of GDP equals the growth rate of TFP plus the weighted average of the growth rates of labor and capital; Or, to express it in a way indicating that TFP is computed as a residual, the growth rate of t A is equal to the growth rate of t Q not accounted for by the weighted average of the growth rates of and tt LK . Equation (2) holds generally. That is, it holds for any period, any value of , and any disaggregation, definition and measurement of the variables involved. Thus, by redefining it as:
where the upper index p denotes the "potential" values of the variables, the researchers of the Congressional Budget Office (henceforth CBO) proceed in two steps. In the first step, using (2) in conjunction with data from the U.S. on account of the rationalization that:
"…, the capital input does not need to be cyclically adjusted to create a "potential" level-the unadjusted capital input already represents its potential contribution to output. Although use of the capital stock varies greatly during the business cycle, the potential flow of capital services will always be related to the total size of the capital stock, not to the amount currently being used." , the series of capital input reported by CBO is the same in both tables.
In Bitros (2019a) the above analytical framework was adapted and applied in conjunction with data for the U.S. nonfarm private business sector to investigate the linkages between capital input and potential output over the period 1949-2016. More specifically, by focusing on the changes in the composition of the capital stock in terms of structures, equipment and intangibles, average service lives, and relative prices of producer's to consumer's goods, that paper allowed for their influence on the capital input and traced the latter's effects on potential output. From the results it emerged that when the capital input is revised to reflect all these changes in the capital stock, the potential supply of output decelerates even faster than suggested by CBO's estimates and as a result the real economy in the years following the 2007 financial crisis appears to have adjusted to its lower potential faster than the protagonists of the secular stagnation hypothesis have suggested. But in as much as the deceleration of potential output is an undesirable development, it may not be due exclusively to the supply side headwinds discussed in that paper, since it may have trended downwards due also to slowing aggregate demand.
Thus, the focus in the present paper is to highlight the possible linkages of potential output supply to influences that may emanate from the demand side of the economy. To this effect, Section 2 lays out the model which is employed in the empirical part. This task is accomplished by expanding along the lines pursued in Bitros (2019a) . In particular, the adjustments in the capital input adopted there are taken a step further to allow for the changes in the intensity of the utilization of fixed as-1 Numbers of tables in the Appendix are preceded by letter A. sets, drawing on the conceptualization that they associate closely with the changes in aggregate output demand. Section 3 comments on the proxy variable used to capture the effects of changes in aggregate demand that are channeled to the potential supply of output through the capital input.
Given that the main body of the data used in the calculations coincides with those presented in the aforementioned study, the emphasis in this section is placed mainly on the issues regarding the definition, measurement and data sources of the utilization rate. Section 4 reports on the results and their possible significance and policy implications; and lastly, Section 5 closes with a summary of the main findings and conclusions.
Linking potential supply and demand for output
Let us go back to equation (2) and redefine it so as to explain the percentage growth rate of output supply in the light of the adjustments made to the capital input in Bitros (2019a):
From the definition it follows that the left side of (4) stands for the percentage growth rate of real GDP produced and supplied in any given period. As for the right side, this shows the contributions from three sources. Namely, the labor input, which corresponds to the percentage rate of change in the hours worked by workers, times 0.7; TFP, which is reckoned as a residual; and the percentage rate of change in the supply of the capital input times 0.3. The new element is the capital input, labeled 1 t K − , which signifies that the capital stock has been adjusted for changes in: (a) its composition in terms of structures, equipment and intangibles, (b) the average service lives of these producer's goods, and (c) their prices relative to consumer's goods.
In view of its treatment by CBO, the quantity of capital services used may or may not coincide with their available supply. The term 1 t %K  − in (4) stands for the percentage rate of change in the maximum available supply of the capital input. It is an upper limit that cannot be exceeded.
But how much of it is utilized in the production process period in-period out depends on the demand for output. Therefore, to obtain an approximate measure of the capital input used by firms, a convenient approach is to introduce the utilization rate ( t u ) of fixed assets, which measures the percentage of available productive capacity utilized at time t. More specifically, we propose to set 
Now the differences between (3) and (6) are quite fundamental both from a theoretical and an empirical standpoint. Adopting the view that the available quantity of capital services represents their potential contribution to output, in essence CBO's researchers maintain that the rate of potential economic growth is unrelated to capacity utilization. More specifically, even though they do not state it explicitly, they reason that while in the short run capacity utilization may affect the rate of economic growth due to price and other rigidities, in the long run the adjustments that take place in the economy render its influence irrelevant. Yet, numerous macroeconomic theorists have argued that the intensity with which firms use their fixed assets is too important to be ignored in the study of economic growth on at least three grounds. The first, emanating from a lengthy literature that includes contributions for example by Calvo (1975) , Hulten (1986 ), Wen (1998 and Chatterjee (2005) , establishes that capacity utilization relates positively to economic growth through the productivity channel. To see this linkage, assume that because of conditions that are inherent in production technologies, up to a point increases in capacity utilization raise productivity, whereas further increases thereafter lead to production bottlenecks and productivity declines. Under these circumstances the marginal cost of capacity utilization in terms of productive efficiency would not be zero and firms might have good economic reasons to use their fixed assets at less than full capacity even in the long run. But then applying (3) would result in overestimation of the rate of potential economic growth because implicit in this equation is the assumption that the marginal cost of capacity utilization is zero, which implies that firms operate their installations always at full capacity.
Unlike the productivity channel, which works through the supply side, the second ground for taking into account the linkage between capacity utilization and economic growth stems from a strand of literature that places sole emphasis on the demand side of the economy. Keynes (1936) was the first to point towards this direction. But his interest was in the study of the short run implications of aggregate demand and it was left to Harrod (1939) , Khan (1959) , Robinson (1962) and Kalecki (1971) to develop insightful dynamic models of the long run. Central to them all, as well as to the models presented more recently by researchers working in the their tradition, like for example Dutt (2006) , Dutt, Ross (2007) and Shaikh (2009) , is the role of capacity utilization as a channel of the influences from changes in aggregate demand to economic growth. Just to sketch the mechanism they envision to be at work, assume that we observe a very simple KeynesKalecki economy with the following characteristics:
• is always equal to investment t I . Now in this economy let the central bank reduce the discount rate to stimulate economic activity and combat unemployment. How might this policy influence economic growth and what might be the role in this regard of the utilization rate u ? The reduction in the discount rate would certainly encourage some firms to bring forward their investment plans. As a result, investment would be expected to accelerate. Assume that the new higher level of planned investment is * t I and that the new higher level of the capital stock consistent with this investment is * t K . In turn, with u given, the planned supply of output will rise to a new higher level, say * t Y , and the same will happen to profits. Over time the share of profits will increase enough so that the savings by profit earners will come to rest at the higher planned level 2 It should be noted that the term "profits" corresponds to "income" from capital. In the long run and under competitive conditions the latter is the product of the normal return on capital r times the quantity of capital stock
of investment where we will have ** tt SI = . From this analysis it follows that the reduction in the central bank discount rate motivates stimulation of aggregate demand by raising the level of planned investment and boosting economic growth. By how much it depends on the utilization rate u , which in this case is held constant. However, having demonstrated the mechanism through which it works, it should not come as a surprise that according to this key model "demand creates its own supply", i.e. the opposite of Say's Law on which CBO's approach is based.
Could thinking along these lines offer some clues to the situation that emerged in the U.S. after the 2009 financial crisis? For this particular period CBO revised downwards its estimates of potential output by 5% due largely to reduced labor and capital inputs. But the Federal Reserve authorities could not do much because the policy interest rate had been reduced already closed to zero, so investment could not be stimulated through this channel. As a result many wandered:
Could the reduction in the capital and labor inputs be due to the lack of demand and not of supply? Some world renowned economists thought that this might be the case and suggested policy initiatives to stimulate aggregate demand. For an example, consider Summers (2014a) . Having returned to this question again and again since Summers (2013) , in page 71 of this paper he answers by stating:
We are seeing very powerfully a kind of inverse Say's Law. Say's Law was the proposition that supply creates its own demand. Here, we are observing that lack of demand creates its own lack of supply. and in page 72 he goes on to recommend, among several other policies, that:
The preferable strategy, I would argue, is to raise the level of demand at any given rate of interest-raising the level of output consistent with an increased level of equilibrium rates and mitigating the various risks associated with low interest rates that I have described.
Yet, perhaps because at the time the U.S. Economy was on its way back to meaningful rates of economic growth, shortly thereafter Summers (2014b) moved away from his emphasis on the lack of aggregate demand and in the direction of researchers who stress the lack of supply by expanding on Gordon's (2014) headwinds that forestall it.
In the meantime, even though the acrimonies between supply-siders and demand-siders appeared to have subsided, that debate was not in vain because it revealed in a forceful way the need for a unified analytical framework in which aggregate supply and demand for output would be given proper weight. The relevant literature is not void in this quest; Slowly and rather quietly research in this direction has made considerable progress. Although these efforts started somewhat earlier than the breakout of the financial crisis in 2009, three notable contributions since then are the ones by Dutt (2010) , Ferri et al (2011) and Fazzari et al. (2013) . If one has to single out only one common element in the models they present, this is none other than capacity utilization. That is why they provide even stronger support than the two grounds we invoked above to justify the introduction into (3) aggregate demand considerations through this channel.
To conclude this summary into the theoretical and empirical reasons that warrant the application of (3) in the form of (6), we find it least creative to take sides as to whether in any period and under any circumstances Say's Law holds sway directly or inversely. In our view in market economies with private ownership of the means of production economic growth is spearheaded other times by supply and other times by demand. So adopting a framework of analysis in which both are allowed to drive the course of potential output is prudent and may prove highly rewarding in terms of explanatory power.
Capacity utilization and potential capital input
Regarding the utilization of productive capacity in the U.S, the database maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St' Louis provides time series at various sectoral levels. The one most relevant to this research is the index labelled "total capacity utilization". But this index goes back only to 1966 and, in as much as we searched for alternative sources of information that might enable us to extend it backwards to match the CBO historical statistics, i.e. to 1949, it proved impossible. For this reason, we adopted the following procedure. The same database reports an index labelled "manufacturing capacity utilization" which goes back to 1947. Thus, assuming that total economic activity correlates strongly with the activity in the manufacturing sector, we regressed the index of total economy capacity utilization ( t tcu ) on the index of manufacturing capacity utiliza- (7) ascertains that using it to project the series of total economy capacity utilization back to 1949 should not involve significant errors of measurement. How successfully this procedure performs is corroborated by the tight tracking of the solid line by the dotted extension of the dashed line.
Looking closer at this figure several significant observations come to mind. One, and perhaps most striking, is that with the exception of 1952 and 1965, which were war years for the U.S., the capacity utilization since 1949 never exceeded 87%. Actually, excluding the years of the Korean and Vietnam wars, the capacity utilization over the period 1949-2016 averaged 81.4%, whereas if we split the years into before and after 1980, the average declined from 83.4% in the first period to 79.0% in the second. From this evidence it follows that as a rule, when firms build productive facilities they never plan to use them fully. For technical, but also for reasons that are inherent to their economic calculus, firms build installations with the intention to use them at some "normal" intensity, leaving some slack capacity as buffer to adjust promptly to unexpected contingencies that develop because of shifts in demand, and not only. However, there is no way of knowing what this "normal" capacity utilization may be and hence, in order to measure the demand pressure on the fixed assets of firms, a possible way out is to assume that the "normal" is indicated by the two lowest historical values in the abridged series of capital utilization, draw a straight line through them, construct an index of relative demand pressure by drawing on the deviations of total capacity utilization from the calculated straight line, and lastly, use this index of demand pressure to compute a demand adjusted series of the capital input.
A second observation is that the time trend of capacity utilization is negative. Why is this so?
From Bitros (2019a) we know that the composition of the capital stock has been changing all these decades in favor of equipment and intangibles and against infrastructures. Could this shift have anything to do with the long term decline in the capacity utilization? Infrastructural investments are generally more discrete and experience higher degrees of duplication than machinery and software. So the decline in their share in the capital stock would be expected to increase, not reduce capacity utilization. And the same is true with the advancement in automation which tends to favor relatively more the equipment part of the capital stock rather than that of infrastructure.
Hence, even though we could not find hard evidence in this regard, most a priori considerations indicate that the culprit in the long term decline of capacity utilization may be associated with the decline in aggregate demand. Moreover, given that during the same period productive capacity as indexed by the ratio of net investment to the capital stock trended downwards at least in manufacturing, 4 the likelihood that both productive capacity and its utilization trended downwards mainly because of slackening aggregate demand does not seem baseless. But then capacity utilization influences potential capital input systematically and hence it should be treated as such by placing emphasis on the demand adjusted series of potential capital input.
Lastly, notice that capacity utilization traces two cycles. One that moves upwards from the middle of the 1950s and ends in a trough around 1980 and another that turns again upwards around the 1980s, reaches an apex in the middle of the 1990s, and since then it has been declining. These cycles are very lengthy and don't have much in common with the forces that drive the normal business cycles in the U.S. economy. Rather they are associated with protracted swings in production technologies and shifting consumer tastes, income distribution and economic policies.
By implication, failing to account for the effects of relative demand pressure, channeled to potential capital input through capacity utilization, may introduce systematic biases into the estimates of potential output. (4) and (5) and
Observe that the graph of 
Potential output under alternative demand adjusted measures of capital input
The series of actual and potential output reported by CBO are shown in Columns (1) of Tables   A1 and A2 , respectively. For convenience we transferred both of them in Columns (1) and (2) of 
Columns (3), (4) and (5) of Table A5 show the series of potential output computed by applying (7) However, aside from their differences in the levels, observe that the curves and pp tt QQ % in Figure 3 differ also, albeit not widely, in their curvatures. The latter reflect the possible differences in the growth rates of the potential output from the two estimates. Thus, to highlight them we computed and in Figure 4 we present the 10 year average growth rates from the two series.
From them it turns out that with the exception of the period in the 1990s, allowing for the demand pressure on the fixed assets of firms in the postwar period would have resulted in higher growth rates of the potential supply of output relative to those estimated by CBO. But otherwise one cannot fail to observe that by both estimates their downward long term trend remains intact.
This transpires because, even though allowing for the impact of aggregate demand would lead to some improvement in the estimated growth rates of potential output, the aggregate demand has not been sufficiently robust to reverse their downward trend. Rather on the contrary, as documented by the long term decline in the utilization rate, aggregate demand has been trending downwards throughout these decades because of its own strong headwinds. By all indications then the U.S. economy has entered into a prolonged period of secular stagnation due to economic growth retardants that operate through both aggregate supply and aggregate demand. For this reason, in addition to the supply side headwinds, it is high time to identify and confront the forces that are reliable for the long term decline in aggregate demand.
Summary of findings and conclusion
CBO researchers estimate potential output by relying on the traditional Solow type growth accounting approach. When they reckon the flow of capital services, they postulate that the potential use of such services is equal to their available supply, because "the potential flow of capital services will always be related to the total size of the capital stock, not to the amount currently being used." However, be this as it may, there is considerable literature establishing that the potential flow of capital services is not related to the total size of the capital stock but to that which is useable on rational entrepreneurial grounds. The introduction in the estimations of potential output of demand-side considerations via the utilization rate is based on this conceptualization.
In particular, we derived two alternative measures of demand adjusted capital input for the U.S. nonfarm private business sector and compared their differential impacts on the potential supply of output relative to the unadjusted index of capital input published by CBO. The results from these comparisons showed that, allowing for the demand pressure on the fixed assets of firms, leads to three effects. It raises the levels of estimated potential output well above CBO's estimates; with the exception of the 1990s, the estimated growth rates turn out to be higher than those computed by CBO; and, lastly, the long term trend of the growth rates with and without the demand adjustment of the capital input is sloping downwards.
The latter finding was not unexpected because aggregate demand as reflected in the utilization rate of fixed assets by firms has been trending downwards throughout the postwar period.
Drawing on these findings we conclude that the path to secular stagnation that the U.S. economy is following in the postwar period is not due solely to headwinds on the supply side. The deceleration in the expansion of productive capacity as well as in the intensity of its utilization cannot be explained in Isolation to the trends that prevail in the aggregate demand. So it is high time that research economists turn their attention to and confront the headwinds that beset this side of the puzzle. Table A1 : Actual data underlying CBO's computations of potential GDP in the U.S nonfarm private business sector
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